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CORRESPONDENCE 
Law Without Mindt 
Steven D. Smith* 
Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things ye are too superstitious. 1 
A large part of the work done by lawyers and judges involves the 
interpretation of enacted law - primarily, statutes and the Constitu-
tion. Not surprisingly, legal scholars offer a good deal of advice, 
usually unsolicited, about how the task of interpretation should be per-
formed. At present, such scholarly advice commonly recommends 
variations on an approach that may be called "present-oriented inter-
pretation." This approach discourages judges from equating a law 
with its historical meaning or "original understanding." Instead, it 
urges them to construe statutes and constitutional provisions in a way 
that will render the law "the best it can be"2 in light of present needs 
and values. 
Of course, present-oriented interpretation also has its critics. One 
objection asserts that the approach is really a disguise for something 
else - for instance, that it is an excuse for judges (or law professors) 
to interpolate their own values into law under the guise of "interpreta-
tion. "3 In this essay, however, I want to consider present-oriented 
interpretation as what it purports to be. Thus, I will assume that the 
approach would significantly and sufficiently constrain judges, that it is 
not merely a device for reading the interpreter's values into law, and 
that it offers a genuine alternative to other common methods or theo-
t © 1989 by Steven D. Smith 
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado. B.A. 1976, Brigham Young University; J.D. 
1979, Yale Law School. - Ed. I thank Richard Collins, Kerry Macintosh, Robert Nagel, and 
Pierre Schlag for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this essay. I also apologize to those 
individuals for my failure to pursue some of their questions and suggestions. As they correctly 
pointed out, the largely negative argument advanced here naturally generates a host of questions 
about how judges should interpret enacted Jaw. My argument may also suggest additional candi-
dates for the category of "mindless" Jaw; Pierre Schlag observes, for instance, that the jurispru-
dence of "original intent" may itself faJI into that category. But an attempt to address such issues 
would require a full-blown theory of interpretation, and presenting such a theory (even if I had 
one to present) would involve a major departure from my own "original intent"; i.e .. to write a 
short essay that makes essentially only one critical point {albeit, I think, an important one). 
I. Acts 17:22 (King James). 
2. See infra notes 12-26 and accompanying text. 
3. Among those who have asserted this criticism I include myself. See Smith, Why Should 
Courts Obey the Law?, 77 GEO. L.J. 113, 158 (1988). 
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ries of interpretation. I will argue that even taken on its own terms 
(or, more accurately, especially if taken on its own terms), present-
oriented interpretation is deeply flawed. Indeed, if present- oriented 
interpretation could actually be all that its proponents claim it is, the 
approach would be even less acceptable than if its critics' more skepti-
cal depiction is correct. 
The influence of the present-oriented approach is so pervasive that 
even a footnote merely listing its numerous variations and proponents 
might go on for pages. Rather than attempt any comprehensive treat-
ment, I will focus on the positions of two important and articulate 
proponents: Professors Ronald Dworkin and T. Alexander 
Aleinikoff.4 Nor will I attempt to survey the multitude of objections 
and responses which even those two scholars are likely to provoke (or, 
in Dworkin's case, have already provoked). Instead, I want to identify 
what seems to me the central but generally overlooked flaw in present-
oriented interpretation: the approach would make law the product 
not of mind, but of accident. 
I. 
Present-oriented interpretation, though familiar enough, is also 
strangely elusive. Perhaps the best way to understand the approach is 
to examine what it shares, and what it does not share, with its leading 
competitors. One competing view is commonly called "originalism," 
although Dworkin prefers to call it "historicism" or "speaker's mean-
ing" interpretation, and Aleinikoff refers to it as the "archeological" 
approach. 5 "Originalism" comes in several versions, 6 but its essential 
contention is that in interpreting a statute or constitutional provision, 
a judge should try to determine what the law meant, or was intended 
to mean, at the time it was enacted. Originalists need not be J?,aive 
about the difficulty of that task. Indeed, they may concede that it is 
rarely possible to ascertain with certainty (and sometimes impossible 
to ascertain at all) what a law was originally intended to mean, and 
they differ in their prescriptions of what judges should do when dis-
4. Dworkin's approach to interpretation is presented in various books and articles but is most 
cohesively explained in R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986). Aleinikoff's proposal is presented 
in Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988). 
5. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 53-54, 359-61; Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 21. 
6. Perhaps the most important distinction is between originalists who believe that interpreta-
tion should try to recapture the "Framers' intent" and those who favor interpretation focusing 
on the original meaning of the text. See generally Powell, The Original Understanding of Origi-
nal Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). The "intentionalist" and "textualist" versions may 
have significantly different implications, but for purposes of this essay, those differences need not 
be considered. 
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cernible original meaning runs out. 7 Originalists can also concede that 
statutes and constitutional provisions may sometimes adopt broad 
principles which must be applied flexibly in light of current condi-
tions. 8 Nonetheless, the quest for original meaning defines, in this 
view, the essential function of legal interpretation. 
A central concern of originalism is that judges be constrained by 
the law rather than be left free to act according to their own lights, a 
course that originalists regard as essentially lawless. Thus, the con-
straints imposed by originalist interpretation seek to realize within the 
judicial branch the venerable ideal of "rule of law, not of men." If 
"rule of law" denotes the approach's leading virtue, its principal per-
ceived vice is captured in another slogan: "the dead hand of the past." 
Even if the original understanding can be ascertained, critics contend, 
adjudication that adheres to such an understanding will often be unre-
sponsive to present values, concerns, and needs. Arguing that judges 
should not feel unduly restricted by an enacting legislature's intent 
even when that intent can be discerned, Aleinikoff asserts: "Law is a 
tool for arranging today's social relations and expressing today's social 
values; and we fully expect our laws, no matter when enacted, to speak 
to us today. "9 
A very different approach to adjudication, if not exactly to "inter-
pretation," is sometimes called (mostly by its opponents) "result-ori-
ented" jurisprudence. Dworkin refers to this approach as 
"pragmatism." As Dworkin describes it, the pragmatic approach 
holds that ''judges do and should make whatever decisions seem to 
them best for the community's future, not counting any form of con-
sistency with the past as valuable for its own sake." 10 The pragmatic 
judge would not necessarily spurn traditional legal authorities, like 
statutes or constitutional provisions, in part because such authorities 
may prove to be useful tools, and in part because they may in fact have 
given rise to practices and expectations which the pragmatic calculus 
7. Some originalists would argue that in such situations a judge must attempt to guess what 
the enactors "would have intended" had they addressed the specific issue more directly. See R. 
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 286-87 (1985) (suggesting that the interpreter "should try to 
put himself in the shoes of the enacting legislators and figure out how they would have wanted 
the statute applied to the case before him"). Others would contend that when original or legal 
meaning runs out, judges should fashion public policy according to their own best judgment. Cf. 
R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 17-22 (1977) (attributing a legal philosophy of this 
kind to positivists such as H.L.A. Hart). 
8. My colleague Richard Collins suggests - correctly, I suspect - that Dworkin's theory of 
interpretation may be seductive in part because it can easily be confused with this kind of flexible 
originalism. But see infra note 19. 
9. Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 58 (emphasis added). 
10. R. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 95. 
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must take into account. However, the judge would not acknowledge 
(except as a "noble lie," for public consumption only) any "duty" to 
obey a statute for its own sake, and would respect the statute only for 
its prospective usefulness. 11 
The principal virtues and vices of pragmatism are just the reverse 
of those attributed to originalism. Whereas originalism is arguably 
unresponsive to present needs and values, pragmatism is exclusively 
concerned with the present and the future; past legal authorities are 
relevant, if at all, only insofar as they implicate current concerns. 
Conversely, by freeing judges of the duty to obey enacted law, pragma-
tism dissolves the constraints constructed by originalism; it authorizes 
the judge to disregard an applicable statute or precedent whenever the 
claims of current policy so advise. In short, pragmatism promises re-
sponsiveness but not, arguably, "law"-like constraint. 
Dissatisfied with both originalism and pragmatism, present-ori-
ented interpretation seeks to appropriate the virtues of each. Like 
originalism, it would restrict judges to "interpretation," thus forbid-
ding free-wheeling judicial forays into the realm of policy creation. 
But the aim of interpretation would no longer be primarily historical. 
Instead, as in pragmatism, judges would become distinctly present-
minded, interpre~ing the law to conform to present needs and values. 
In this spirit, Aleinikoff urges the judge to "treat the statute as if it had 
been enacted yesterday and try to make sense of it in today's world."12 
This approach prescribes "textual analysis" - but analysis "in a pres-
ent-minded fashion."13 
To illustrate the method, Aleinikoff discusses an immigration law 
enacted in 1952 which excludes, among other persons, "[a]liens af-
flicted with psychopathic personality, epilepsy, or a mental defect."14 
Aleinikoff asks whether this provision should be construed to prohibit 
immigration by aliens who are homosexuals. When the statute was 
enacted in 1952, he observes, Congress almost certainly believed that 
the language covered homosexuals. The statute was enacted pursuant 
to a comprehensive study of the immigration system by the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, which had recommended the exclusion of 
"homosexuals and other sex perverts." And the Senate Report ac-
companying the immigration bill had explicitly noted that "[t]he Pub-
lic Health Service has advised that the provisions for the exclusion of 
11. See generally id. at 154-60 (elaborating Dworkin's conception of pragmatic decision 
making). 
12. Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 49 (emphasis in original). 
13. Id. at 47 n.117. 
14. Id. at 48 (quoting 66 Stat. 163, 182 (1952)). 
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aliens afflicted with psychopathic personality or a mental defect ... is 
sufficiently broad to provide for the exclusion of homosexuals and sex 
perverts."15 Nonetheless, Aleinikoff goes on to explain how a present-
minded interpreter could construe the provision not to cover homosex-
uals. The interpreter, he suggests, "ought to begin by noticing that the 
statute nowhere mentions homosexuality, and the phrase 'psycho-
pathic personality' does not spring to mind as a ready category into 
which to place it."16 In addition, interpreting the statute not to ex-
clude homosexuals is consistent with what Aleinikoff regards as the 
more pertinent and sound legal practices of today, as well as with "the 
accepted view of the medical and psychiatric professions."17 Thus, a 
construction that declines to apply the statute to homosexuals, 
although it concededly "violate[s] the clearly expressed intent of the 
enacting legislators,"18 is faithful both to present values and to the 
statutory text. 
Although Dworkin's theory of interpretation is more elaborate and 
thus more difficult to pin down19 - indeed, his responses to criticism 
suggest that his critics have never yet quite managed to pin him down 
- his theory is closely analogous in essential respects to 
Aleinikoff's. 20 Where Aleinikoff insists on textual analysis, Dworkin 
demands interpretive "fit." The judge cannot just do whatever she 
15. Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 47 (quoting S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., !st Sess. 9 (1951)). 
16. Id. at 50. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 51. 
19. One possible source of confusion may be noted here and, hopefully, avoided. In Dwor-
kin's view, interpretation, while it does not aim primarily to recapture the framers' or enactors' 
intent, does give some weight to what legislators have said about the law they enacted; and there 
are passages in Dworkin, especially in his earlier writing, that if taken in isolation might even 
suggest that Dworkin advocates a kind of originalism in which the interpreter is bound by the 
general principle or concept adopted by the enactors rather than by their specific conception. See, 
e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 135-36. If this were Dworkin's position, then he would be 
advancing a particular version of originalism or the speaker's meaning theory of interpretation, 
rather than a criticism of and an alternative to that theory; in that case, this essay's analysis of 
present-oriented interpretation would not apply to Dworkin. But it is clear that Dworkin is not 
merely offering an improved version of originalism. Indeed, in his recent book he describes the 
theory of originalism just noted and expressly rejects it. Dworkin explains how Hercules, a 
mythical judge who begins by favoring originalism and then is forced by difficulties and criticism 
to modify his approach, might eventually conclude that he should "enforce the most abstract and 
general political convictions from which legislators act rather than the hopes or expectations or 
more detailed political opinions they have in mind when voting." R. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 
317. Such a view is at least very close to the version of originalism that Dworkin's discussion of 
"concepts" and "conceptions" might seem to endorse. But Dworkin promptly dismisses this 
view, observing that it is "only a poorly stated and unstable form of Hercules' own method, into 
which it therefore collapses." Id. 
20. Aleinikoff observes that his own "approach is similar [to Dworkin's], although it is less 
concerned with Dworkin's dimension of 'fit' (that is, the telling of a story that harmonizes earlier 
interpretations into a coherent whole)." Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 47 n.117. Aleinikoff's refer-
ence is to Dworkin's "chain novel" analogy. See infra note 24. 
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pleases, or whatever strikes her as sensible or fair; she must confine 
herself to "interpreting" the law. And a proper interpretation must 
"fit," or be consistent with, the text or practice that is the object of 
interpretation.21 Similarly, where Aleinikoff urges the interpreter to 
be "present-minded," Dworkin requires ''justification." By this 
Dworkin means that the interpreter should select the interpretation 
most compatible with current values and with the best available polit-
ical and ethical theory.22 Thus, the object of interpretation is to make 
the law "the best it can be" by present standards. 23 This presentist 
orientation rejects, or at least greatly de-emphasizes, the quest for 
framers' or authors' intent - a quest that Aleinikoff and Dworkin 
respectively belittle with the labels of "archeology" and 
"historicism. "24 
By combining elements of both competing approaches, proponents 
of present- oriented interpretation hope to capture the virtues of those 
competitors while avoiding their debilitating vices. Present-oriented 
adjudication would be constrained, and thus "lawful," because judges 
would be confined to "interpretation." Aleinikoff insists that his rec-
ommended approach is "not nontextual . . . . [T]he fact that the stat-
ute is written . . . provides a significant restraint. "25 Likewise, 
Dworkin emphasizes that Hercules, his mythical ideal judge, cannot 
just render any decision that he regards as fair or desirable; the re-
quirement of "fit" may eliminate results that Hercules might have pre-
ferred. 26 At the same time, because interpretation seeks conformity 
not with historical meaning or intent, but rather with present values 
and needs, it would be responsive to current concerns. 
21. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 66, 230, 338-39, 380. 
22. Id. at 231, 350, 380. 
23. Id. at 52, 62, 337. 
24. See supra note 5. Dworkin and Aleinikoff offer captivating analogies to explain their 
recommended approach. Dworkin uses the analogy of the "chain novel." In interpreting a stat-
ute or constitutional provision, a judge is like a writer involved in a multi-member project in 
which one author writes the first chapter of a novel, then passes it on to another author who will 
write the second chapter, and so on. The judge does not write on a clean slate; his product must 
maintain continuity with the chapters already written by his predecessors. With that qualifica-
tion, however, the judge must write his own chapter as well as he can, rather than guessing what 
earlier authors might have expected him to do. R. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 228-38. 
Aleinikoff employs a "nautical" metaphor for statutory interpretation. "Congress builds a 
ship and charts its initial course, but the ship's ports-of-call, safe harbors and ultimate destina-
tion may be a product of the ship's captain, the weather, and other factors not identified at the 
time the ship sets sail." Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 21. In this view, the "dimensions and struc-
ture of the craft determine where it is capable of going, but the current course is set primarily by 
the crew on board." Id. 
25. Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 60. 
26. R. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 379-80. 
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II. 
As presented by its supporters, present-oriented interpretation 
seems well-nigh irresistible. By incorporating the virtues of its com-
petitors, the approach offers us the best of both worlds. Or does it? 
Start with the question of constraining judges. As noted, propo-
nents of present-oriented interpretation claim that the approach 
would place significant constraints on judges. One objection, which I 
will simply note and then set aside, contends that this claim is false; 
the requirement of "fit" is so loose that the judge will usually be 
presented with a virtual smorgasbord of eligible interpretations, and 
she will be able to select an interpretation that suits her own moral and 
political tastes. Thus, present-oriented interpretation is nothing more 
than closet pragmatism. 27 This is an important criticism, but for the 
moment I want to assume that it is unfounded; i.e., that present-ori-
ented interpretation would significantly constrain judges.28 Taken on 
its own terms, present-oriented interpretation provokes an even more 
fundamental objection. 
That objection can best be presented in stages. Begin by consider-
ing more closely the notion of "constraint." It is true that originalism 
values "constraint," but not just any kind of constraint. Judges might 
be "constrained," after all, by a rigid requirement that all cases be 
decided in favor of the party whose surname has alphabetical prior-
ity. 29 Or, if reading the entrails of birds were reduced to a method 
that produced uniform results, we might severely constrain judges by 
insisting that they decide cases according to that method. Such re-
quirements would "constrain," but they would not thereby possess 
even the slightest appeal. Nor has it ever seemed a cogent response to 
those who, like the Legal Realists, argue that law is indeterminate, to 
say: "Aha, you contradict yourselves! First you say that the judge has 
wide discretion, but then you turn around and admit that the judge is 
constrained - by what he ate for breakfast." 
If such an argument seems fatuous, that is because the point worth 
27. Roscoe Pound expressed such a view with a metaphor that was less complimentary than 
Dworkin's "chain novel" analogy or Aleinikolf's "nautical" metaphor; Pound chose the meta-
phor of the juggler or sleight-of-hand artist. He condemned "spurious interpretation" whose 
object is "to make, unmake, or remake and not merely to discover. It puts a meaning into the 
text as a juggler puts coins ... into a dummy's hair, to be pulled forth presently with an air of 
discovery." Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 CoLUM. L. REV. 379, 382-83 (1907). 
28. For those who find the criticism persuasive, therefore, much of the following discussion 
will have a distinctly hypothetical character. Neither the advantages claimed by proponents of 
present-oriented interpretation nor the difficulties which I will describe will seem real, since con-
strained present-oriented interpretation will be regarded as merely illusory anyway. 
29. Cf. B. CURRIE, SELECTED EssAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 609 (1963) (ironically 
proposing a similar rule of decision for choice-of-law cases). 
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discussing deals not with the existence of "constraints" in the abstract, 
but with whether the law can impose the proper kind of constraints. 
And what is the proper kind of constraint? At this point, the contrast 
between originalism and present-oriented interpretation is subtle but 
critically important. Both the originalist and the presentist may offer 
seemingly identical answers: the judge is properly constrained by 
"statutes" and by the Constitution; i.e., by enacted law. But these an-
swers are in reality quite different because when the positions speak of 
"statutes," or enacted law, they mean different things. 
Just as "man" can be defined as a "featherless biped," a "rational 
animal," or "the offspring of deity" - and each of these divergent 
definitions might conceivably be correct - so a statute can be under-
stood in critically different ways. Viewed one way, a statute or consti-
tutional provision is just a collection of words - words with a special 
diction and tone, perhaps, but in the end not all that different from the 
words one might find in a technical treatise, a law review article, or 
even a science fiction novel. The same collection of words that ap-
pears in a statute might be written by anybody - a doodling political 
hack, a scribbling reformer, a law student practicing legal drafting -
without acquiring any special credentials or claim to legal authority. 
Viewed another way, however, the statute is not just a collection of 
words, but rather the expression of a collective decision: a decision 
made by the established political authority and expressed in a form 
recognized as conferring legal force and validity upon the decision. In 
maintaining that judges should be constrained by statutes, originalism 
adopts this latter view of what a statute is. Originalism, in other 
words, insists that judges should be constrained to obey enacted law 
not because constraint is good for its own sake, nor because there is 
anything magical about the way words are arranged in a statute, but 
because a judicial obligation to obey enacted law is the means by 
which the power of the political community to make effective group 
decisions is realized. 
The whole thrust of present-oriented interpretation, by contrast, is 
to reject or resist a view which understands statutes primarily as the 
expression of particular decisions made by specific, temporally situ-
ated political officials. On the contrary, the presentist insists that to be 
bound by the statute does not entail being bound by the actual human 
understanding or collective decision that brought the statute into be-
ing. But this view effectively separates the statute from the source of 
its authority. To be sure, the words of the enacted law may continue 
to constrain the judge. But the essential fact that made those words 
(and not a science fiction novel, or even a law review article) effica-
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cious to bind the judge -i.e., the fact that the words express a specific 
collective decision made by the designated political authority - is 
now de- emphasized or dismissed. The legal text is methodically disso-
ciated from the phenomenon upon which its power to constrain 
depends. 
The important question that emerges from this new perspective is 
not whether the statute, so viewed, could constrain judicial choice. 
Perhaps it could. But the critical question is why a statute, so un-
derstood, should constrain judges. If the statute is understood not as 
the expression of a collective decision by the established political au-
thority but rather as a kind of thing-in-itself, a free-floating text, then 
why is its right to command any greater than that of, say, the political 
treatise or the science fiction novel? 
The point is easy to miss, or to misperceive, in part because we 
suspect that the severing of the statutory words from the human un-
derstanding that initially produced them is never completely effective. 
To be sure, we can· hypothesize a situation in which words come to 
mean something totally different from what they were originally in-
tended or understood to mean. But it is questionable whether in the 
law such a drastic transformation ever really occurs. It seems that 
something - the ingrained habits and perspectives of the legal profes-
sion, perhaps, or the continuity of language, or the obstinate underly-
ing nature of humanity or of the cosmos - will ensure that legal 
words uttered decades ago will continue to carry for us something like 
the meaning they held for those who first spoke them. Hence, the 
status of words in a statute never quite degenerates to the level of 
words in a science fiction novel; the senselessness of severing words 
from the understanding that produced them, and then of treating 
those words as authoritative constraints, never fully appears. 
But it would be unseemly for a proponent of present-oriented in-
terpretation to take refuge in the observation that presentist interpre-
tations will probably correspond pretty closely to the original meaning 
anyway. After all, the presentist proposal offers a meaningful alterna-
tive to originalism only insofar as present interpretations do depart 
from original understanding. Insofar as continuity obtains, such that 
original understanding and present interpretation coincide in their 
conclusions, the presentist attack on originalism is a mere academic 
exercise without practical consequence. Hence, the essential presentist 
contention is - and must be - that at least in some instances original 
understanding and present-minded interpretation will substantially di-
verge, and that when such divergences appear, the present-oriented 
interpretation should prevail over the original understanding. And in 
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assessing this proposal, we should struggle to suspend our sense of 
inevitable continuity, and to judge the proposal by the stark case in 
which present-minded interpretation produces a result wholly con-
trary to the statute's original meaning and intent. In that (perhaps 
imaginary) case, the severing of the statutory words from the un-
derstanding and decision that produced the words is complete; the 
statutory words become a disembodied artifact, not the expression of a 
discrete collective decision. 
Viewed in this way, the words of a statute have no more authority 
to constrain than do the words of a science fiction novel. In neither 
case are the words treated as expressing an actual, conscious decision 
of the political community or its established authorities. And in both 
cases, therefore, the pertinent question is not whether the words can 
constrain, but rather why in the world they should. -
Ill. 
Present-o.riented interpretation, it seems, fails to achieve the objec-
tive of originalism; it constrains judges, perhaps, but it does not con-
strain them to respect collective decisions actually made by the 
political community. Neither does present-oriented interpretation re-
alize the objectives of pragmatism. It counsels judges to be present-
minded. But the judges' ability to promote present values and objec-
tives will be hampered by the requirement that they confine them-
selves to "interpreting." Thus, Dworkin assures us that in some cases 
Hercules will not be able to reach the result that current values or 
theories of justice would prescribe because that result would require an 
interpretation that does not plausibly "fit" enacted law and established 
practice. Jo 
To the pragmatist, such a limitation must seem like pure, irrational 
traditionalism; the limitation insists upon loyalty to the past even 
when that loyalty serves no present purpose.31 Hence, just as present-
oriented interpretation may appear to the originalist to be closet prag-
matism, to the pragmatist it may seem a kind of closet originalism. 
But the equation is imperfect. In fact, the present-minded judge faces 
a predicament which is worse in one way than that which confronts 
the originalist. 
30. See supra text accompanying note 26. 
31. As noted above, a pragmatic orientation may supply reasons for applying statutes and 
constitutional provisions, and it may even provide reasons for construing the text according to its 
meaning in present ordinary usage. Insofar as parties have actually formed expectations and 
have acted in reliance upon their understanding of the text, for example, a pragmatic judge de-
voted to doing present justice might be more concerned with the parties' understanding of the 
text than with the enactors' understanding. See Smith, supra note 3, at 136. 
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Suppose the pragmatist poses the following challenge: Let us as-
sume that in a given case, result A would be the "best" result as mea-
sured by present values and needs; it would be the fairest result, or the 
result that best promotes sound public policies. But result A cannot 
be squared with any plausible interpretation of an apparently control-
ling statute, which was enacted some decades ago. Instead, by all 
plausible interpretations, the statute appears to command result B, 
which runs contrary to current notions of fairness and to public poli-
cies that are now widely accepted (though not, of course, reflected in 
the older statute pertinent to this case).32 In such a situation, it seems, 
both originalism and present-oriented interpretation would require the 
judge to choose result B. But what sense is there, the pragmatist de-
mands, in such a course? Indeed, to argue for such a conclusion seems 
almost self-contradictory, like arguing that it is better to choose the 
worse result. 
The pragmatist's challenge may be embarrassing for either the 
originalist or the present-minded interpreter. But the originalist at 
least has a plausible response. Interpreting enacted laws according to 
the understanding of those who adopted them is a way of conferring 
upon the political community the power to make collective decisions. 
T9 be sure, those collective decisions may sometimes be misguided, or 
they may become outdated. In such cases, originalist interpretation 
may inhibit judges from promoting present interests and values; a 
judge may be forced to respect a past decision, and thus to reach result 
B even though result A is admittedly more consistent with present 
values. The originalist can argue, however, that this is a cost worth 
bearing in order to preserve the power of collective self-determination. 
By contrast, how does the proponent of present-oriented interpre-
tation respond to the pragmatist's challenge? Having already divorced 
statutory meaning from the legislative understanding or intent that 
produced the statute, she cannot now argue that result B is required 
on the basis of respect for a collective community decision. For all she 
knows, such a result is not in any meaningful sense required by an 
actual, conscious decision. Or, to put it differently, the present-
minded judge would feel perfectly free to reach result A if exactly the 
same original collective decision had been expressed in different lan-
guage which, with the passage of time and the evolution of values and 
32. Of course, in practice the ability of a judge to say with any confidence that result A is 
preferable to result B, despite the legislature's thus far unaltered decision to the contrary, is 
questionable. Thus, an originalist might well reject the hypothetical altogether on the ground 
that by assuming that result A is known to be best, the hypothetical adopts an assumption that 
will rarely if ever obtain in the real world. 
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language, could now plausibly be read to support that result. For the 
presentist, the obstacle to reaching the pragmatically "best" result is 
grounded not in the collective decision, but rather in the words: the 
present-minded interpreter cannot reach the desirable result because 
the legislature happened to use words that cannot be read to support 
that result. She is inhibited from realizing present justice not by a 
decision made by conscious human beings, but instead by an inani-
mate text. 33 
IV. 
This conclusion suggests that the criticisms discussed thus far are 
merely preliminary. For example, a moment ago I asserted that pres-
ent-oriented interpretation, by severing the legal text from the un-
derstanding of the officials who produced and adopted that text, cuts 
the connection between the text and the political authority to which 
the text owes its power to constrain. But it now appears that this ob-
jection understates the problem. Present- oriented interpretation not 
only cuts the connection between text and political authority; it severs 
the link between text and mind. The interpretations rendered and the 
results reached by presentist judges will turn (at least in those cases 
where the method of present-oriented interpretation makes a differ-
ence) less on mind- on conscious human thought expressed through 
actual decisions - than on historical accident. 
Aleinikoff's discussion of immigration law provides a valuable ex-
ample of just this kind of accident. As Aleinikoff presents the situa-
tion, it is as clear as such things can be that the enacting Congress 
intended to prohibit immigration by homosexual aliens and used lan-
guage that, in Congress' understanding, expressed that decision. But 
it is also true that three- and-a-half decades later the language chosen 
by Congress would probably not be commonly understood as referring 
to homosexuality; if a statute employing such language actually had 
33. Nor do the "nautical" and "chain novel" metaphors, see supra note 24, have much force 
to deflect the pragmatist's challenge. In response to the "nautical" metaphor, the pragmatist can 
simply ask, "What sense does it make to stay on board a ship that is not, at least in this instance, 
taking us where we want to go?" Likewise, the pragmatist can dismiss the "chain novel" meta-
phor as manifestly inapposite to the judge's task. After all, the only reason why the writer of a 
later chapter in a chain novel has a responsibility to maintain continuity with earlier chapters is 
that he is involved in producing a work that is intended to be, and will be, read as a whole; 
readers normally do not pick out chapters in the middle and read them without reading what 
came before and what comes after. But the judge may be dealing with persons who know little 
(and care less) about what the law was like decades ago; those persons are concerned that the law 
be "the best it can be" now. Past chapters of the legal story had their own readers, of course, but 
those readers are long since dead. In short, it is not at all clear why the "chain novel" analogy 
has any relevance for judges. In this respect, the analogy of the business manager, for whom 
what happened last year is a "sunk cost," seems more apt. 
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been enacted yesterday (as Aleinikoff asks us to suppose of the real 
statute), we probably would not read it as excluding homosexuals. A 
nonexclusionary construction, Aleinikoff goes on to say, is more con-
sistent with present pertinent legal practice than is a construction ad-
hering to the original legislative intent. Thus, a judge can promote 
present values and preferred legal practices while remaining faithful to 
the statutory text (though not, Aleinikoff concedes, to the understand-
ing of the enacting legislature).34 
Aleinikoff 's assertions about historical intent and current usage 
seem plausible enough. The trouble is not with what Aleinikoff says, 
but with what he fails to say: i.e., that his analysis makes everything 
hinge on an historical accident. When it enacted the statute, Congress 
used words that were evidently understood as referring to, among 
other things, homosexuality. Congress might just as easily have said 
"homosexuality"; it did not use that precise word only because it ap-
parently believed that it had used a somewhat more inclusive but es-
sentially synonymous term. If Congress had used the word 
"homosexuality," then Aleinikoff's construction would collapse; a 
present-minded interpreter could no longer "begin by noticing that the 
statute nowhere mentions homosexuality."35 On the contrary, even if 
enacted yesterday, a statute so worded would clearly cover homosexu-
als, and the homosexual alien would apparently be out of luck. But 
because Congress happened to use different words to express the same 
decision, a diametrically opposite result obtains. The alien's fortunes 
turn on a fortuity. 
The difficulty is hardly unique to Aleinikoff 's particular illustra-
tion. Legislators, like other human beings, can often express the same 
idea in more than one way. In many situations, therefore, at least two 
ways of expressing a public decision may, at the time of enactment, 
seem almost synonymous; the formulation that is in fact .chosen will 
depend largely upon stylistic preferences, or upon mere chance. Years 
later, however, the possible readings of those alternative formulations 
may come to diverge. To the originalist, the enactors' choice of for-
mulations should in principle make no difference because the judge is 
expected to implement the statute according to its original meaning, 
not its meaning at the time of subsequent application. Neither will the 
choice of formulations have great significance for the pragmatist, 
though for a different reason; seeking to further present interests, the 
34. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text. It should be noted that Aleinikoff's con· 
clusion, though neither his reasoning nor his particular version of present-oriented interpreta· 
tion, might be compatible both with pragmatism and with some versions of originalism. 
35. Aleinikolf, supra note 4, at 50. 
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pragmatist will not feel bound to obey the statute, however it happens 
to be worded.36 But if one "treat[s] the statute as if it were enacted 
yesterday"37 and then, with that fictitious qualification, continues to 
insist on respect for the text, the different formulations may have 
vastly different legal consequences. Thus, for the present-minded in-
terpreter the enactors' choice of formulations - a choice that may 
have turned largely on chance - proves to be dispositive. 
In this respect, present-oriented interpretation presents a striking 
contrast to both originalism and pragmatism. In those views, the law · 
evolves out of discrete acts of mind; it is the product of human beings 
who deliberate about problems and then make conscious decisions 
about how those problems may best be addressed. The locus of such 
acts of mind differs as between the theories. The originalist assigns 
responsibility primarily to legislators, who ordinarily make and ex-
press their decisions in the form of statutes. The pragmatist, con-
versely, encourages judges to decide what policies and results will 
advance justice and public policy. In either case, however, law 
originates with, and is developed by, acts of mind. 
Present-oriented interpretation, by contrast, makes law substan-
tially the product of historical· accident. To be sure, legislators con-
tinue to study problems and make decisions - decisions that are 
expressed in statutes. But the whole point of present-oriented inter-
pretation's attack on "historicism" and "archeology" is to cut the tie 
between the legislative intent, or the legislators' understanding of what 
they have decided, and the statute itself. The connection between the 
statute and the act of mind that produced it is thus in large measure 
dissolved. 38 Likewise, judges will continue to consider cases and 
render decisions. But the whole point of the presentists' attack on 
pragmatism is that a judge must not simply study a problem and then 
render the decision that seems most just or useful. Instead, the judge 
is supposed to reach a decision by the distinctly different process of 
"interpreting" statutes - statutes which the presentist has deliber-
ately and methodically unmoored from the acts of mind in which they 
originated. 
The result comes close to achieving, at least in aspiration, a law 
that is in the most literal sense "mindless." Of course, the law would 
36. Of course, to the extent that the original choice of wording has influenced present prac-
tices and expectations, the pragmatist's decision will be indirectly affected by the legislature's 
initial choice. 
37. Aleinikolf, supra note 4, at 49 (emphasis omitted). 
38. Cf. R. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 316 ("[Hercules] takes note of the statements the 
legislators made in the process of enacting [a statute], but he treats them as political events 
important in themselves, not as evidence of any mental state behind them."). 
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still be the product of mental processes, just as decisions based on in-
terpreting astrological configurations or on reading palms or tea leaves 
are the result of (perhaps very intricate) mental processes. But such 
decisions are not, at least not in the most important sense, based on 
"mind." Similarly, when statutes are understood as "texts" but not as 
the expression of actual, conscious, temporally situated decisions, the 
connection to "mind" is cut; the statute becomes a kind of Rorschach 
blot; it constrains-there are thousands of things that an observer just 
· can't see in a Rorshach blot-but its contraints are fortuitous, not the 
product of conscious deliberation. And the critical question, more 
vexing now than in its earlier appearances, is not whether such a stat-
ute can guide judges, but whether there is any conceivable reason why 
it should. A person might search for answers to vital personal ques-
tions in a Rorschach blot; he might even.find answers there. But who 
wants to turn his life over to a Rorschach blot? 
v. 
Until the early thirteenth century, those indicted were put to an ordeal. 
In the ordeal of'Water, for example, a priest would conjure the water not 
to accept a liar, the accused would swear to his innocence, and then he 
would be lowered in: if he floated his oath was shown to be perjured, 
and he was therefore guilty of the offence. The whole mechanism turned 
upon the invocation of the priest; and after long and anxious inquiry, the 
church in 1215 decided that it was all superstition and forbade priests to 
take any part. The decree was promptly obeyed in England, and the 
mode of trial of centuries was brought to an end. 39 
The elimination of trial by ordeal is regarded as an important ad-
vance in the development of law. But that specific advance was only 
part of a larger achievement by which law has come to be seen as the 
product not of natural or historical fortuity, but of mind.40 More 
than seven centuries after the abolition of the ordeal, however, the 
widespread appeal of present-oriented interpretation suggests that this 
larger achievement remains insecure. Ironically, perhaps, the achieve-
ment seems especially insecure among legal scholars. 
At this point it may be reassuring to recall an objection that I ear-
lier noted and set aside. The objection asserted that present-oriented 
interpretation is really just a disguised form of something else, that it 
is really just closet originalism or closet pragmatism. As it turns out, 
there is comfort in the supposition that present-oriented interpretation 
39. S. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS 01' THE COMMON LAW 358-59 {1969). 
40. For a valuable exploration of the importance of "mind" in law, see J, VINING, THE 
AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN (1986). 
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is not what it purports to be. Letting legislators make collective deci-
sions has its risks, after all, but there is much to be said for such a 
system. Letting judges fashion the law according to their understand-
ing of justice and sound public policy may be even more worrisome; 
still, arguments favoring that kind of system are also available. But it 
is hard to think of any recommendation for a regime of law created by 
the "interpretation" of disembodied words that have been methodi-
cally severed from the acts of mind that produced them. Such a re-
gime would represent a step back in the direction of the rule of 
fortuity. 
